

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 1 March 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to forward, for your kind consideration, a cable message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lam Akol Ajawin, regarding resolution 1591 (2005) (see annex).

I would highly appreciate it if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Omar B. Manis
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the letter dated 1 March 2006 from the
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the
Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President
of the Security Council**

[Original: Arabic]

1 March 2006

1. Immediately upon the adoption, on 29 March 2005, of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005), calling for the imposition of sanctions against the parties to the conflict in Darfur, the Government of the Sudan defined its position on the resolution despite its unfairness, when the Sudanese delegation presented to the Security Council a statement to the effect that the Government of the Sudan, aware that it was a committed Member of the United Nations, respected the Security Council resolution and would cooperate in its implementation, because it was not like other States that paid no attention to Security Council resolutions.
2. On the basis of this principle, we have adopted a position of cooperating to the utmost, notwithstanding the biased content of the resolution. The moment the Secretary-General appointed a Panel of Experts in accordance with paragraph 3 of the resolution, we evinced a spirit of full cooperation. A coordinator of the Panel of Experts was appointed in Khartoum, carefully chosen to serve as a focal point for the Panel, to arrange all its meetings with the institutions and ministries related to its work and to ensure its unimpeded access to whatever information it desired.
3. In addition, we went so far in our cooperation as to set up focal points for the Panel in the Darfur States so as to facilitate its task of carrying out field visits to the region. We even arranged field visits for the Panel in places other than Darfur, including a visit by an expert to customs at Port Sudan, and through the office of the coordinator in Khartoum we arranged a programme of interviews.
4. The Permanent Mission of the Sudan continually received the Panel of Experts with open arms and made every effort to facilitate their travel procedures to the Sudan, from the granting of entry visas to the provision of communication channels in Khartoum. In addition, the Permanent Mission coordinated with the Embassy of the Sudan in Addis Ababa, where the Panel's office was based, in order to facilitate its tasks, its travel and its communications, especially with the African Union.
5. Even more importantly, the Government of the Sudan provided the Panel with highly secret and highly important information because it was confident that it was cooperating with a responsible body coming from an institution that was trustworthy and responsible in the handling of sensitive information with the requisite confidentiality, secrecy and institutional treatment that took into account the immunity of leaders and officials and, first and foremost, valued positive cooperation and collaboration with Member States in the throes of crises such as this.
6. We greatly regret to say that, despite all that limitless cooperation with the Security Council and its organs, the Government of the Sudan was deeply shocked to see the secret list prepared by the Panel of Experts, containing the names of leaders, ministers and officials, on the pages of Western newspapers and on satellite channels, without the slightest regard for their immunities.

7. Those officials were tried by the media and slandered before the Panel of Experts even reached any decision on the matter, without the minimal consideration for the negative impact and repercussions of this on conditions in the Sudan, including the Abuja talks.

8. Consequently, my country's Government, in view of the Security Council's assumption of responsibility for this regrettable action, expects to receive from the Council a statement to the effect that such acts will not be repeated, for otherwise the Government of my country will be compelled to suspend its cooperation in this matter.

(Signed) Lam Akol **Ajawin**
Minister for Foreign Affairs